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INTRODUCTION 
There are now few written federal or state civil procedure laws 
broadly authorizing pre-suit discovery. Yet with the increasing 
amounts of electronically stored information (ESI) relevant to future 
civil litigation, the regularity of ESI loss/destruction, and the growing 
availability of substantive law claims involving pre-suit evidence 
spoliation, there is a compelling need for new written laws on pre-suit 
court orders involving evidence preservation.  
Current written civil procedure laws generally authorize pre-suit 
discovery perpetuating witness testimony via depositions in order to 
prevent a failure of justice arising because a witness will likely be 
unavailable later. Fewer procedural laws authorize pre-suit discovery 
aimed at identifying potential defendants or potential causes of action. 
Virtually no current civil procedure laws address broader pre-suit 
court orders involving evidence preservation.1 They should, moving 
such orders from the “fringes.”2  
Pre-suit evidence preservation duties generally arise under two 
types of laws. One embodies post-lawsuit civil procedure laws on 
discovery sanctions for failure to produce evidence that should have 
been preserved, but was lost, pre-suit. The other encompasses 
substantive law claims for damages arising from pre-suit evidence 
losses.  
New written civil procedure laws should authorize pre-suit court 
orders involving evidence preservation when the requested evidence 
is relevant to imminent civil litigation and will likely spoil otherwise. 
These new laws should originate in amendments to current written 
civil procedure laws on witness testimony perpetuation via deposition 
and not the laws on discovery sanctions as suggested by Professor A. 
Benjamin Spencer.3 New laws should authorize information gathering 
 
 1. We employ, not unlike civil discovery laws on relevancy, as with FRCP 
26(b)(1) where discoverability is not synonymous with admissibility, the phrase 
“evidence preservation” to encompass the nonprivileged information and materials 
available in civil litigation discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  
 2. See generally John Leubsdorf, Fringes: Evidence Law Beyond the 
Federal Rules, 51 IND. L. REV. 613 (2018) (noting that outside of civil procedure, as 
with evidence, important principles on litigation processes remain on the “fringes”). 
 3. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation: Regulating and 
Sanctioning Pre-Litigation Spoliation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 
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during pre-suit discovery, as well as pre-suit orders, declaring a lack 
of any preservation duty where a pre-suit evidence preservation 
demand has been made, is disputed, and warrants immediate judicial 
attention. The availability of more expansive pre-suit orders under 
written civil procedure laws will promote greater uniformity among 
the trial courts,4 prompt more informed settlement talks, and enhance 
accuracy in later litigation factfinding.5 
I. CURRENT CIVIL PROCEDURE LAWS ON PRE-SUIT DISCOVERY 
A. Perpetuating Witness Testimony via Deposition and Preserving                            
Other Evidence 
Federal and state civil procedure laws authorizing pre-suit 
discovery have several distinct purposes. One purpose, widely 
pursued, involves evidence preservation for foreseeable civil actions 
via depositions of witnesses who may not be available later.6 Federal 
Civil Procedure Rule (FRCP) 27, substantially replicated in many 
states, authorizes testimony perpetuation via deposition “about any 
matter cognizable in a United States court” where the “petitioner 
expects to be a party to an action” in a U.S. court but “cannot 
presently” sue.7 Under this rule, a deposition can only be ordered to 
 
2022–24 (2011). We respectfully disagree with Professor Spencer’s thoughtful 
suggestion on adding new pre-suit evidence preservation duties to the general civil 
procedure laws on post-suit discovery sanctions. 
 4. See Joshua M. Koppel, Federal Common Law and the Courts’ Regulation 
of Pre-Litigation Preservation, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 101, 121 (2012) 
(supporting federal court use of state pre-suit discovery standards, especially when 
actual or possible state law claims or defenses are in play). We generally support 
independent federal judicial rulemaking regarding pre-suit discovery orders 
authorized by federal district courts relevant to both federal and state law claims and 
defenses. 
 5. These goals may also be achieved through greater use of equitable bills 
of discovery, undertaken in the absence of written discovery laws. See, e.g., Rupert F. 
Barron, Annotation, Existence and Nature of Cause of Action for Equitable Bill of 
Discovery, 37 A.L.R. 5th 645 (1996) (collecting and analyzing cases since 1950). Our 
preference is for written standards guiding judicial discretion. Written laws should 
reflect more precisely when pre-suit discovery methods may be used (e.g., only when 
a petitioner cannot presently bring a civil action), what discovery methods are 
available (e.g., deposition only), and for what purposes they may be employed (e.g., 
only to perpetuate testimony).  
 6. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1)(A). 
 7. Id.; see also ALASKA R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1)(A); 
ARK. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-156a(a)(1)(A) (2019); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 13-1-227(a)(1) (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-27(a)(1)(A) (2019); NEB. 
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“prevent a failure or delay of justice.”8 Through the use of such a 
deposition, a prudent petitioner can request that the deponent produce 
documents and other tangible things at the deposition or submit to a 
physical or mental examination.9 A deposition to perpetuate testimony 
“does not limit a court’s power to entertain an action to perpetuate 
testimony,” a power substantially defined by “the former equitable bill 
in equity to perpetuate testimony.”10 Such a bill predates the FRCP and 
is generally read similarly to the current FRCP requirements on 
testimony perpetuation.11 
An Illinois Supreme Court rule is somewhat similar but different 
in important aspects.12 The rule authorizes testimony perpetuation via 
deposition regarding any matter that may be cognizable not only in 
any court but also in any proceeding.13 There is no need under the 
Illinois rule to show the petitioner cannot presently sue.14 One 
condition for a pre-suit deposition, fixed by the authorizing court, can 
be the production of “documents or tangible things” containing 
matters within the scope of the permitted examination.15  
A New York statute on pre-suit evidence preservation orders 
differs from the federal and Illinois provisions, as it expressly covers 
varying disclosure devices, including depositions, interrogatories, 
physical and mental examinations, and requests for admission.16 A 
New Jersey court rule authorizes “[a] person who desires to . . . 
preserve any evidence or to inspect documents or property or copy 
documents” to petition for pre-suit discovery; yet, the petitioner must 
be “presently unable to bring” a suit or cause it to be brought.17 
 
CT. R. DISCOVERY § 6-327(a)(1)(i); S.C. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1); W. VA. R. CIV. P. 
27(a)(1).  
 8. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(3).  
 9. See id. (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 34 and 35). 
 10. FED. R. CIV. P. 27(c); Shore v. Acands, 644 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 11. See, e.g., Shore, 644 F.2d at 389; see also Lubrin v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 
109 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D.V.I. 1986) (most cases find “independent action to obtain 
discovery” is similar “to the antiquated instrument called an equitable bill of 
discovery”).  
 12. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 217.  
 13. See id. 217(a)(1). 
 14. Id.; see also MD. R. 2-404(a)(2); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-18-12 (2019); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 804.02(1)(a) (West 2019). 
 15. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 204(a)(1). 
 16. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3102(a), (c) (McKinney 2011) (pre-suit “disclosure to aid 
in bringing an action, to preserve information, or to aid in arbitration”).  
 17. N.J. CT. R. 4:11-1(a); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Borgata Hotel 
Casino & Spa, 195 A.3d 538, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2017) (extending N.J. 
CT. R. 4:11-1 to pre-suit petitions to insurance companies of insureds who receive 
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Pre-suit witness testimony perpetuation is sometimes addressed 
in special laws, which may not differ much from general laws. In 
Montana, there is not only a court rule similar to FRCP 27, but there 
is also a similar court rule benefitting a “person who desires to 
perpetuate testimony regarding the historical beneficial use of any 
water right claim.”18 In Missouri, a statute covers pre-suit witness 
depositions “to perpetuate testimony” where “the object is to 
perpetuate the contents of any lost deed or other instrument of writing, 
or the remembrance of any . . . matter . . . necessary to the recovery 
. . . of any estate or property . . . or any other personal right.”19 
Beyond certain depositions, written civil procedure laws 
generally fail to address pre-suit judicial orders on preserving other 
evidence. An equitable bill in discovery occasionally is employed to 
preserve other evidence. In 2012 in Chicago, a state trial court ordered, 
via an “emergency bill,” a medical facility to preserve and release 
documents related to the failure by its refrigeration machines to 
maintain sperm samples.20 And after being involuntarily removed 
from a United Airlines plane on April 9, 2017, Dr. David Dao secured 
from a Chicago trial court, via an “emergency bill,” a pre-suit order.21 
On April 11, 2017, Dr. Dao requested the preservation and protection 
of, inter alia, a surveillance video, the passenger and crew lists, 
personnel files, the protocol on passenger removal, and all incident 
reports.22 A bill was granted on April 17, 2017, per party agreement.23 
The range of such bills on preserving nondeposition evidence remains 
unclear, however. As will soon be demonstrated, Illinois courts do 
recognize a common law tort for pre-suit negligent spoliation of 
evidence.24 Yet, that duty seemingly did not arise in the two aforenoted 
emergency discovery bill cases. 
 
notices of possible later lawsuits); In re Kemmerer, No. OCN-L-1815-18, 2019 WL 
1494788, at *1, *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2019) (citing In re Hall ex rel. Hall, 688 
A.2d 81 (N.J. 1997)). 
 18. MONT. R. WATER ADJ. R. 28; see MONT. R. CIV. P. 27.  
 19. MO. REV. STAT. § 492.420 (1939). 
 20. See Doe v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 19 N.E.3d 178, 184–85 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) 
(noting the grant followed an “agreement of the parties”); In Court, CHICAGO DAILY 
L. BULL., July 19, 2012, at p. 2, col. 5-6. 
 21. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-402 (West 2006). 
 22. See Elliot C. McLaughlin, “Man Dragged Off United Flight Has 
Concussion, Will File Suit, Lawyer Says,” CNN (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/13/travel/united-passenger-pulled-off-flight-lawsuit-
family-attorney-speak/index.html. 
 23. See id.  
 24. See infra Part III. 
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B. Identifying Potential Defendants 
Less frequent in the United States are written civil procedure 
laws authorizing pre-suit discovery seeking to identify potential 
defendants. There is no explicit written FRCP. But such discovery is 
sometimes available in state trial courts where there are civil actions 
already pending, meaning one or some but not all defendants have 
been identified. For example, the Illinois statute on respondents in 
discovery says that a plaintiff “in any civil action may designate as 
respondents in discovery . . . those individuals or other entities, other 
than the named defendants, believed by the plaintiff to have 
information essential to the determination of who should properly be 
named as additional defendants in the action.”25 Information can be 
secured from nonparty respondents as from defendants.26  
Other civil procedure laws authorize pre-suit discovery aimed at 
identifying potential defendants though there is no pending, related 
civil action. In Illinois, beyond the respondent in discovery law, there 
is a court rule on an “independent action” pursued by a potential 
claimant for “the sole purpose of ascertaining the identity of one who 
may be responsible in damages.”27 In New York, a statute authorizes 
pre-suit discovery “to aid in bringing an action.”28 In Ohio, a civil 
procedure rule allows pre-suit discovery “necessary to ascertain the 
identity of a potential adverse party.”29 
C. Identifying Potential Causes of Action 
Related to the laws on identifying potential defendants, there are 
some pre-suit civil discovery laws aiding petitioners seeking to 
 
 25. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-402. 
 26. See id. 
 27. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a)(1). 
 28. N.Y. CIV. PRACTICE LAW § 3102(c) (McKinney 2011); see also Lucas v. 
Neidlinger, 81 S.E.2d 825, 828 (Ga. 1954) (describing pre-suit discovery where 
information “peculiarly within the knowledge” of others). 
 29. OHIO CIV. R. 34(D)(3)(a)–(b); see also Bay EMM Vay Store, Inc., v. 
BMW Fin. Servs. N.A., 116 N.E.3d 858, 861 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (petitioner must 
also be “otherwise unable to bring the contemplated action”); White v. Equity, Inc., 
899 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that the rule may be employed 
even where any later claim would be subject to contractual arbitration); Benner v. 
Walker Ambulance Co., 692 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (explaining 
how the rule supplements, and was promulgated in response to a case interpreting, the 
statute on pre-suit discovery aimed at identifying potential causes of action). 
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identify potential causes of actions.30 Here potential defendants may 
be known, but their roles—if any—in causing harm is unknown and 
may not become known without pre-suit discovery (i.e., res ipsa 
loquitur scenarios). Illustrative is a Texas Civil Procedure rule 
allowing a petition seeking deposition authorization in order “to 
investigate a potential claim or suit,” including judicial authority 
where there is only an “anticipated suit.”31 Under this rule a petitioner 
must demonstrate that the deposition order “may prevent a failure or 
delay of justice” or that “the likely benefit” of the deposition 
“outweighs the burden or expense of the procedure.”32 Authorized 
depositions are governed by “the rules applicable to depositions of 
nonparties in a pending suit.”33 Thus, document or ESI production can 
be sought.34  
A New York statute is broader, as it authorizes varying pre-suit 
discovery devices, including depositions, interrogatories, physical and 
mental examinations, and requests for admission “to aid in bringing 
an action.”35 An Ohio statute allows “a person claiming to have a cause 
of action” who is “unable to file his complaint” without discovery 
“from the adverse party” to “bring an action for discovery . . . with any 
interrogatories . . . that are necessary to procure the discovery 
sought.”36 
 
 30. See Scott Dodson, Federal Pleading and State Pre-suit Discovery, 14 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 43, 43 (2010) (advocating for greater pre-suit discovery in 
order to assist aspiring claimants to secure information needed under heightened 
pleading standards); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access to Information, Access to 
Justice: The Role of Pre-suit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 217, 
217 (2007) (advocating for expanding such laws in order to promote greater access to 
justice for those with claims but limited resources). 
 31. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.1 (describing conditions limiting post-lawsuit 
depositions can also limit pre-suit depositions); see also In re Jorden, 249 S.W.3d 416, 
418 (Tex. 2008) (discussing a statute limiting discovery in health-care lawsuits 
(plaintiff must first serve an expert report applicable to pre-suit depositions)).  
 32. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.4(a); see also In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 
361 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (benefits do not outweigh burdens, especially as trade 
secrets were involved). 
 33. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.5.  
 34. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 176.2, 199.3 (stating that a subpoena for oral 
deposition can include command to “produce and permit inspection and copying of 
designated documents or tangible things”). The history behind the pre-suit discovery 
rule in Texas is reviewed in In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 605–08 (Tex. 2014).  
 35. N.Y. CIV. PRACTICE LAW § 3102(a), (c) (McKinney 2011); see also 
Lucas v. Neidlinger, 81 S.E.2d 825, 827 (Ga. 1954) (allowing pre-suit discovery on 
information that is “necessary” and “peculiarly within the knowledge” of others). 
 36. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.48 (LexisNexis 2019). The statute 
“occupies a small niche between an unacceptable ‘fishing expedition’ and a short and 
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D. Post-suit Discovery Sanctions for Pre-suit Evidence Preservation 
Failures 
Pre-suit evidence preservation duties are commonly enforced 
through post-suit discovery sanctions. Thus, federal and state civil 
procedure laws, sometimes very generally37 and sometimes quite 
specially,38 recognize possible post-suit discovery sanctions for certain 
pre-suit information losses that come to light when relevant 
information is not available yet is subject to a timely post-suit 
discovery request.39 Additionally, in the absence of written civil 
procedure laws,40 procedural common law rulings untethered to 
statutes sometimes employ inherent power when considering 
sanctions for information losses covered by a respondent’s duty to 
preserve in anticipation of foreseeable litigation.41 Whether discovery 
 
plain statement of a complaint or a defense.” Poulos v. Parker Sweeper Co., 541 
N.E.2d 1031, 1034 (Ohio 1989). The statute may be employed even where any later 
claim would be subject to contractual arbitration. See White v. Equity, Inc., 899 
N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 
 37. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219(c) (providing sanctions against parties who 
unreasonably refuse to comply with discovery rules); see also Shimanovsky v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. 1998) (“[A] potential litigant owes a duty to 
take reasonable [pre-suit] measures to preserve the integrity of relevant and material 
evidence.”). 
 38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (providing sanctions when unavailable ESI 
“cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery” though it “should have 
been preserved in the anticipation . . . of litigation”); see also WYO. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
Under FRCP 37(e), available sanctions vary dependent upon whether the lost 
evidence arose from negligent or grossly negligent conduct rather than bad faith acts. 
See Schmalz v. Vill. of N. Riverside, No. 13 C 8012, 2018 WL 1704109, at *6 (N.D. 
Ill., Mar. 23, 2018). 
 39. See TENN. CIV. P. R. 34A.01 (stating that before expert testing that will 
materially alter relevant evidence, a “party” shall seek a court order and sanctions can 
follow for an “offending party”). Sometimes discovery sanction laws exclusively 
speak to post-suit information losses. See id.  
 40. See Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng. & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 
368 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that Rule 37 only permits sanctions for violations of an 
“order”). At times, written laws will be narrowly read, as when they include only 
certain sanctionable conduct. See id. 
 41. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 
2001) (discussing federal court inherent power to sanction for pre-suit evidence 
spoliation); see also Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) 
(noting that earlier circuit panel rulings applied state law to sanctions for pre-suit loss 
or destruction of evidence in federal question cases); Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 
427 F.3d 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[F]ederal law governs the imposition of 
spoliation sanctions” in a diversity case); Fines v. Ressler Enters., Inc., 820 N.W.2d 
688, 690 (N.D. 2012) (discussing when state court inherent power is utilized to 
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sanctions flow from written laws or common law rulings, possible 
sanctions typically include default judgments or claim dismissals,42 as 
well as adverse jury instructions.43  
These duties on pre-suit evidence preservation prompting post-
suit sanctions sometimes reflect certain of Professor Spencer’s 
suggestions. His proposal speaks to the reasonable anticipation of a 
pending civil action when the evidence was lost, wherein a “party” can 
be sanctioned in a civil action if that party earlier received an evidence 
preservation request from another party no more than sixty days before 
the commencement of the action.44 His proposal also speaks to a pre-
suit preservation duty when there is reasonable anticipation of a 
pending civil action by a later party because that party had notice of 
events prompting a possible claim and of “resulting harm of sufficient 
magnitude to make related litigation probable.”45 Finally, Professor 
Spencer suggests that a pre-suit evidence preservation duty, which 
upon breach can result in a discovery sanction in a pending civil 
action, encompasses circumstances where the party “took steps in 
anticipation of asserting or defending against a claim in the pending 
action” or where there was “a statutory or regulatory duty to 
preserve.”46  
 
sanction a party for pre-suit evidence spoliation); Tatham v. Bridgestone Ams. 
Holding, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 734, 740–46 (Tenn. 2015).  
 42. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (b)(2)(A)(v)-(vi), (e); see also WYO. R. CIV. P. 
37(e)(2)(C) (stating that a possible sanction involving unrestorable and irreplaceable 
ESI could be to “dismiss . . . or enter a default judgement”); WYO. R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2)(A)(v)-(vi) (stating that possible sanctions involving restorable ESI and non-
ESI are dismissal or default judgment).  
 43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i) (stating that the 
court can order that facts “be taken as established”); WYO. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2)(B) 
(stating that the court can instruct the jury that it “may or must” presume information 
was unfavorable to the party being sanctioned regarding unrestorable and 
irreplaceable ESI); WYO. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i) (discussing sanctions involving 
restorable ESI and non-ESI); see also Wackenhut Corp. v. Gutierrez, 453 S.W.3d 917, 
921 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (holding that spoliation jury instructions will be 
inappropriate where a failure to preserve did not deprive a litigant of a meaningful 
ability to present a claim or defense). 
 44. See Spencer, supra note 3, at 2022–23 (discussing proposed amendments 
FRCP 37(e)(1)(C)(ii) and 37(e)(2)(B)).  
 45. Id. at 2023 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1)(C)(ii) and quoting FED. R. CIV. 
P. 37(e)(2)(C)). 
 46. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1)(C)(ii) and quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(e)(1)(C)(iii), (D)). Quite sensibly, a civil procedure law on sanctioning evidence 
losses can be employed when there is a breach of a substantive law duty on evidence 
preservation. 
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Procedural laws on pre-suit evidence preservation duties 
germane to post-suit discovery sanctions do not always follow 
substantive law pre-suit evidence preservation duties that can lead to 
money damage claims. Borrowing from Robert Frost, an Appellate 
Court described one harmed by spoliated evidence as confronting 
“two roads diverged in a wood,” wherein the elements for pursuing a 
discovery sanction differ from the elements for pursuing a substantive 
law claim involving evidence spoliation.47 Post-suit discovery 
sanctions for pre-suit evidence preservation failures can be authorized 
generally or can be addressed in special discovery sanction laws.48 
1. General Sanctioning Authority 
FRCP 37 generally authorizes sanctions for the failure to 
produce certain lost ESI (like restorable or replaceable ESI), as well 
as for the failure to produce lost non-ESI (like paper documents), that 
should have been preserved in anticipation of litigation.49 Guidelines 
for sanctions involving nonrestorable and nonreplaceable ESI differ 
from sanctions authorized for lost but replaceable ESI and for lost non-
ESI,50 as do the guidelines on the types of culpability necessary for 
finding discovery violations.51 A number of states have comparable 
general civil procedure discovery laws.52 Other state courts employ 
 
 47. See Adams v. Bath & Body Works, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 645, 652 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2005) (finding sanction of dismissal requires deliberate or contumacious conduct 
or “unwarranted disregard of the court’s authority” while a spoliation of evidence 
claim in tort “requires mere negligence” (quoting Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
692 N.E.2d 286, 291 (Ill. 1998))).  
 48. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 
 49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (failure to comply with a court order); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 37(c) (failure to disclose, to supplement an earlier discovery response, or to 
admit); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d) (failure to attend a deposition, to serve answers to 
interrogatories, or to respond to a request for inspection).  
 50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (covering only irreplaceable or nonrestorable 
ESI and expressly mentioning only four possible sanctions); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(b)(2) (recognizing a broader category of possible sanctions (including staying 
proceedings, specific evidentiary bars, and striking only portions of pleadings) for 
lost, but replaceable or restorable ESI, and for lost non-ESI).  
 51. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). While FRCP 37(e) distinguishes between 
intentional and unintentional discovery failures involving nonrestorable and 
nonreplaceable ESI, FRCP 37(b) speaks generally to failures to obey court orders on 
discovery involving other ESI and non-ESI without differentiating between the types 
of culpability. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b), (e). 
 52. See, e.g., WYO. R. CIV. P. 37; see also D.C. SUP. CT. R.C.P. 37; VT. CIV. 
P. R. 37 (including only the initial portion of FED.R. CIV. P. 37(e) so it does not speak 
to intentional acts). 
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laws that fail to distinguish between some ESI and other ESI, or 
between ESI and non-ESI.53  
2. Special Sanctioning Authority 
Post-suit discovery sanctions may also follow violations of 
special, or explicit, pre-suit evidence preservation duties. As just 
noted, a FRCP and some state laws now speak to the consequences of 
failing to produce during discovery a certain form of “lost” ESI that 
“should have been preserved in the anticipation . . . of litigation.”54 
This form involves ESI that “cannot be restored or replaced through 
additional discovery.”55 Sanctions, only available where there is 
prejudice to another party, normally encompass solely “measures no 
greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.”56 However, when the 
evidence loss resulted from a party’s actions intended “to deprive 
another party of the information’s use in the litigation,” more 
significant sanctions are possible.57  
An earlier section of the same FRCP also spoke specifically to 
ESI. That section, now operative in some states,58 only directed that 
“[a]bsent exceptional circumstances,” no discovery sanctions should 
follow failures to provide ESI “as a result of the routine, good-faith 
operation of an electronic information system.”59 This allows courts 
 
 53. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 219. A 2014 Committee Comment declared that 
the rule “is sufficient to cover sanction issues as they relate to electronic discovery.”  
 54. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). An early proponent of such a special ESI rule was 
Martin H. Redish. See Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation 
Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 608 (2001) (suggesting a conditional cost-shifting rule); 
see also Stanley Richards, The False Promise of Proposed Rule 37(E): Why It Will 
Not End Data Producers’ Over-Preservation Habits, 32:2 YALE L. & POL’Y. REV. 
INTER ALIA 34, 38–41 (2014) (providing a critique of the current special ESI rule, 
written when it was being considered). 
 55. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).  
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1). 
 57. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2) (such sanctions include a presumption that the 
lost information was unfavorable, a jury instruction embodying an unfavorable 
presumption, a dismissal, and a default judgment); see also Wai Feng Trading Co. v. 
Quick Fitting, Inc., No. 13-33WES, 2019 WL 118412, at *7 (D.R.I. Jan. 7, 2019) 
(containing significant review of the rule). 
 58. See, e.g., ME. R. CIV. P. 37(e); see also TENN. R. CIV. P. 37.06(2); N.D. 
R. CIV. P. 37(f). Ohio Civil Procedure Rule 37(e) is comparable but goes on to 
elaborate on the factors to be used in determining whether to impose sanctions. See 
OHIO R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Lost ESI Under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 25 (2017) 
(explaining the history behind the ESI sanction rule changes in 2015). 
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more discretion in determining where sanctions are appropriate.60 But 
it fails to discourage adequately the disposal of information important 
to later foreseeable litigation that could be very easily and 
inexpensively retained.  
A current special Arizona discovery rule on pre-suit ESI 
preservation contains some elements of both the former and current 
FRCP sections on pre-suit ESI preservation.61 Rather than the 
“exceptional circumstances” prescribed under the former federal rule, 
the Arizona rule authorizes sanctions for failing to take “reasonable 
steps” to preserve ESI that is destroyed due to the “routine operation” 
of an ESI system or of an “application of a document retention 
policy.”62 Additionally, preservation of information is explicitly 
required when one “reasonably anticipates an action’s 
commencement” wherein one would be either a defendant or a 
plaintiff.63 Like the current FRCP, the Arizona rule comparably 
addresses sanctions for lost ESI that cannot be “restored or replaced.”64 
Unlike the current FRCP, the Arizona rule sets out factors relevant to 
inquiries into “reasonable steps to preserve relevant” ESI.65  
II. INADEQUATE DISCOVERY LAWS ON PRE-SUIT EVIDENCE 
PRESERVATION ORDERS 
For now, there are generally no written civil procedure laws 
authorizing pre-suit discovery aimed at evidence preservation where 
the potential defendants and causes of action are known and where 
those pursued for information pre-suit will likely be available for post-
suit discovery. This Article posits that pre-suit evidence production 
and maintenance orders should be available against those who owe 
duties to the petitioners, whether via criminal laws, civil procedure 
discovery laws on sanctionable conduct, regulatory record retention 
laws, and/or contract and where there is a very good chance that the 
duties will be breached, resulting in harm to the petitioners. As well, 
there are generally no written civil procedure laws authorizing pre-suit 
 
 60. See Mont. State Univ.-Bozeman v. Mont. First Judicial Dist. Court, 426 
P.3d 541, 559 (Mont. 2018) (utilizing rule founded on the earlier version of FRCP 
37(e) and finding the sanction of a default judgment constituted an abuse of 
discretion).  
 61. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(g).  
 62. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(g)(1)(A), (C)(i). 
 63. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(g)(1)(B). 
 64. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(g)(2).  
 65. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 37(g)(1)(C)(ii).  
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protective orders on behalf of those receiving evidence preservation 
demands who successfully urge they have no evidence preservation 
duties, but there should be. 
An Arizona court rule, effective July 2018, does authorize 
certain pre-suit evidence preservation orders that are not aimed at 
perpetuating witness testimony or at identifying potential defendants 
or potential causes of action.66 Rather, it speaks to judicial 
determinations on “the existence or scope of any duty to preserve” 
ESI.67 The rule permits discovery orders directed at those against 
whom there is no “anticipated litigation.”68 It also allows one in receipt 
of a “preservation request” concerning information relevant to 
“anticipated litigation” to petition for a pre-suit order determining the 
“existence or scope” of any ESI preservation duty.69 Yet the rule 
requires that petitions regarding the ESI preservation duties of 
nonparties occur in a “pending action in which the request is made,”70 
not unlike the aforenoted Illinois statute on nonparty respondents in 
discovery where a pending civil action is required.71  
Written civil procedure laws should go much further. They 
should authorize pre-suit discovery orders, or discovery immunity, 
concerning evidence where there is no preexisting legal duty. Such a 
duty could be deemed to arise simply from a pre-suit request to 
preserve and/or produce information. Civil procedure laws should not 
go as far as to authorize pre-suit evidence preservation discovery 
based solely on an information request that is denied or that goes 
unaddressed. Requests for information alone should not prompt 
evidence preservation responsibilities.  
Pre-suit civil discovery laws originate in varying sources, 
including court rules, statutes, and case precedents. These laws can be 
general or special. General laws are exemplified by the broad array of 
federal and state civil procedure rules on pre-suit testimony 
perpetuation accomplished through depositions of those likely to be 
unavailable later. Special duties are illustrated by the Florida statutory 
 
 66. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(e).  
 67. Id.  
 68. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(b)(1).  
 69. ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(b)(1), (e)(1). Rule 45.2(e) petitions need not be 
preceded by “meet and confer” consultations. See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 45.2(e); see also 
ARIZ. R. CIV. P 16(b)(1); (c)(8)(B)(xiii).  
 70. ARIZ. R. CIV. P 45.2(b)(2); see also ARIZ. R. CIV. P 26(c)(1) (explaining 
that protective orders sought by a nonparty to whom an ESI preservation request is 
made to be sought “in the court in the county where the action is pending”).  
 71. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-402 (2006).  
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provisions on pre-suit discovery involving later medical negligence 
claims and defenses.72 Thus, possible new pre-suit evidence 
preservation laws may come from a variety of lawmakers.  
Possible new laws may speak only to certain evidence, like 
irreplaceable or nonrestorable ESI. Some current civil procedure laws, 
as noted, already differentiate between certain ESI, other ESI and non-
ESI.73 Other possible new laws may speak to a broader array of 
evidence, including all forms of both ESI and non-ESI. 
In crafting new pre-suit discovery laws, preemption issues can 
arise. One recurring issue can be whether new written pre-suit civil 
discovery laws supersede, or merely supplement, earlier case 
precedents, like those on equitable bills in discovery. Written laws 
sometimes now obliquely reference the continuing vitality of case 
precedents, for example, by recognizing the continuing availability of 
“an action” or an “independent action” seeking discovery.74 Other 
current laws are silent about their effects.75 Any new written discovery 
laws on pre-suit evidence preservation orders should be clear about 
the continuing vitality of earlier precedents and the roles of earlier and 
related statutes and rules. Certainly, new written laws on pre-suit 
evidence preservation/production can be exclusive, thus preempting 
earlier laws—whether written or common law. 
Before further exploring the needed expansions of laws on pre-
suit evidence preservation orders, the Article first reviews current 
substantive law claims for pre-suit evidence loss.76 Such substantive 
law claims, together with the earlier noted civil procedure laws on 
post-suit sanctions for pre-suit evidence losses, should primarily 
provide the foundations for any new written laws on pre-suit evidence 
preservation orders.77 Because the substantive as well as the post-suit 
procedural laws now vary between U.S. jurisdictions, we anticipate 
that any new pre-suit evidence preservation laws might vary between 
 
 72. FLA. STAT. § 766.106(6)(a) (2013) (“Upon receipt by a prospective 
defendant of a notice of claim, the parties shall make discoverable information 
available without formal discovery.”). 
 73. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2), (e). 
 74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 27(c); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.290(c) (governing pre-suit 
depositions to perpetuate testimony); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a) (promulgating rules for 
pre-suit discovery by “[a] person or entity” seeking to ascertain “the identity of one 
who may be responsible in damages”). 
 75. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-156a (West 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 15-6-27(a) (2019); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 27; ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 27; MD. R. CIV. P. 2-404. 
 76. See infra Part III.  
 77. See supra Part I (discussing existing laws on post-suit sanctions). 
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jurisdictions.78 Yet variations cause difficulties, as in choice of law 
settings and with lawyer uncertainties regarding how current conduct 
will later be assessed. Our hope is that new written pre-suit evidence 
preservation laws will be largely comparable, reducing such 
difficulties. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE LAW CLAIMS FOR PRE-SUIT EVIDENCE 
SPOLIATION 
Several states recognize claims for evidence spoliation involving 
loss or unavailability of information that results in harms involving 
diminished or eliminated opportunities to present civil claims or 
defenses.79 Such claims may arise from general or special laws. Often, 
such claims are recognized in common law precedents.80 Significant 
interstate variations exist, including differences on who owes an 
evidence preservation duty; the manner in which such a duty is 
breached; and the available remedy upon breach.81 The following 
 
 78. See supra Part I (noting that federal and state civil procedure laws vary 
in scope and sanctions). 
 79. Compare Hibbits v. Sides, 34 P.3d 327 (Alaska 2001) (recognizing 
intentional third-party spoliation as a tort that could be pursued against a state trooper 
by motorcycle riders hurt by a pickup truck driver who collided with them, where 
trooper—first on the scene—removed the driver for about two hours after the collision 
because the trooper knew the driver was under the influence of marijuana), with 
Ortega v. City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189 (N.Y. 2007) (declining to create 
intentional or negligent spoliation tort claims against a city that sold a vehicle it was 
ordered to preserve so that future claimants could use it in a later suit against the 
vehicle manufacturer). We recognize there may be, but do not address, implied causes 
of action for evidence spoliation against prosecutors pursued by those criminally 
accused. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (“[U]nless a criminal 
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially 
useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.”); State v. DeJesus, 
395 P.3d 111, 124 (Utah 2017) (reaffirming precedent on state constitutional due 
process obligation of prosecutors to preserve evidence, which requires “a reasonable 
probability that [the] lost evidence would have been exculpatory” and, if so found, a 
balancing of the culpability of the State and the prejudice to the defendant in order to 
determine an appropriate remedy).  
 80. See, e.g., Ortega, 876 N.E.2d at 1193 (recognizing claims for spoliation 
of evidence arise in common law precedents). 
 81. While there are interstate differences, at least for corporations there are a 
useful set of guiding principles on organizational practices regarding record 
disposition. See The Sedona Conference, Commentary on Defensible Disposition, 20 
SEDONA CONF. J. 179, 195–98 (2019). 
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review of current U.S. state laws employs Illinois policies to compare, 
categorize, and explore the varying state approaches.82  
Prelawsuit evidence preservation duties, prompting substantive 
law claims, usually in tort,83 on behalf of those harmed by evidentiary 
losses, are described in the Boyd case in Illinois as follows: 
The general rule is that there is no duty to preserve evidence; however, a 
duty to preserve evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract, a 
statute . . . or another special circumstance. Moreover, a defendant may 
voluntarily assume a duty by affirmative conduct. In any of the foregoing 
instances, a defendant owes a duty of due care to preserve evidence if a 
reasonable person in the defendant’s position should have foreseen that the 
evidence was material to a potential civil action.84  
These duties are only somewhat akin to the duties under Illinois 
civil procedure laws to have evidence available when requested via 
formal discovery, including duties to preserve before civil litigation 
commences.85 
 
 82. See Steven Plitt & Jordan R. Plitt, A Jurisprudential Survey of the Tort of 
Spoliation of Evidence: Resolving Third-Party Insurance Company Automobile 
Spoliation Claims, 24 CONN. INS. L.J. 63, 70–71 (2017). To date, Article III federal 
courts have not generally recognized substantive federal law claims grounded on 
evidence spoliation. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 
2001); Lombard v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 621, 627 (N.D. Ohio 1998) 
(finding no federal claim, though there was a violation of federal regulation on record 
retention). 
 83. At times, duties regarding information maintenance may also be 
undertaken through contract, as with employees who are required, as a condition of 
employment, to provide confidential information to their employers. See, e.g., 
Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1057 (Pa. 2018) (Saylor, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (finding information maintenance claims against employers 
can sound in both tort and contract, presenting a hybrid scenario). 
 84. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270–71 (Ill. 1995) (internal 
citations omitted). Similar descriptions appear in other state court precedents. See 
Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 569 (W. Va. 2003) (first quoting Boyd, then 
adopting both a negligent and intentional tort claim for evidence spoliation by a 
nonparty, but only an intentional tort claim for evidence spoliation by an adverse 
party); Oliver v. Stinson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 19 (Mont. 1999) (first quoting 
Boyd, then recognizing both a negligent and intentional tort claim for evidence 
spoliation). 
 85. See, e.g., Shimanovsky v. Gen. Motors Corp., 692 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ill. 
1998) (if trial court could not “sanction a party for the presuit destruction of evidence, 
a potential litigant could circumvent discovery rules or escape liability simply by 
destroying the proof”). Remedies for breaches of evidence preservation duties vary 
depending upon whether the duties arose under tort law or civil procedure laws on 
discovery. For example, sanctions involving adverse jury instructions may only be 
rendered post-suit and arise solely under civil procedure laws. Pre-suit information 
preservation duties differ from pre-suit information maintenance duties. See, e.g., 
Dittman, 196 A.3d at 1043, 1047–48 (duty owed by employer to employees “to 
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Breaches of substantive pre-lawsuit evidence preservation duties 
may be addressed in at least two different ways: through a claim for 
spoliation, which often will be presented and heard concurrently with 
the underlying suits in which the lost or destroyed evidence would 
have been relevant,86 or through the imposition of a formal discovery 
sanction.87  
A. Common Law Tort Law Claims 
Common law torts, as per Boyd, involving evidence spoliation 
can arise through a “special circumstance” or through a voluntary 
assumption of a preservation duty “by affirmative conduct.”88 A 
special circumstance may involve a fiduciary or otherwise special 
relationship between parties where future civil litigation is reasonably 
anticipated.89 Relevant relationships, where there are no explicit 
 
exercise reasonable care” to safeguard the employees’ sensitive personal data when 
the employers collect and store it “on its internet-accessible computer system”).  
 86. See Parness, supra note 59, at 39; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (the 
advisory committee’s note to the 2015 amendment, described earlier, recognizing that 
the discovery sanction rule was not intended to “affect the validity of an independent 
tort claim for spoliation if state law applies in a case and authorizes the claim”).  
 87. In a federal district court, the inherent power of the court can be employed 
to address pre-suit evidence spoliation, as in Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 
F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (involuntary dismissal of lawsuit was not an unduly 
harsh sanction arising from a discovery failure involving the failure to preserve a car). 
In Illinois, the inherent power of the court can be found under Supreme Court Rule 
219(c). See, e.g., Peal v. Lee, 933 N.E.2d 450, 457–58 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (stating 
there are possible sanctions for discovery noncompliance involving spoliation of 
electronic evidence include adverse inference instructions to the jury and involuntary 
dismissals with prejudice). 
 88. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270–71. Similar common law torts can be pursued 
outside of Illinois where the Boyd rationale is followed. See Oliver, 993 P.2d at 19–
20; Hannah, 584 S.E.2d at 569–70. 
 89. See Oliver, 993 P.2d at 20 (explaining the duty to preserve evidence may 
arise against third-party spoliator “based upon a contract . . . or some other special 
circumstance/relationship”) (citing Johnson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 234, 239–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)); Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (insured sued insurer for promissory 
estoppel or voluntary assumption of duty when insurer destroyed tire it examined that 
was needed by insured for its later product liability suit, where a promise to safeguard 
was made by the insurer). Determinations of such special circumstances can be 
challenging. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Lyman, 903 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2018) (owner 
of LLC that was represented by a lawyer was owed no duty of care by the lawyer as 
long as owner was not “a direct and intended beneficiary” of the legal representation). 
Comparably, a “special relationship of trust and confidence” in an otherwise “ordinary 
business” relationship can prompt a duty to disclose “material information.” BAS 
Broad., Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 110 N.E.3d 171, 175 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018). 
668 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
agreements or contracts on evidence preservation in play, can include 
insurer-insured and attorney-client relationships.90 Here, information 
germane to a future case may not be procured or preserved by an 
insurer or an attorney or a doctor, resulting in harm to an insured or a 
client or a patient in a later anticipated case.91 Similarly, a special 
circumstance could arise when an expert, retained by a future litigant 
without an explicit agreement on evidence preservation, loses 
information passed to the expert for analysis. Yet for insurers, 
attorneys, doctors, and experts, there seemingly may be few such 
spoliation claims pursued, since related claims seemingly can be 
founded on implicit or explicit duties involving agreements or 
contracts, like duties to defend, represent, treat, or test only in 
reasonable fashions. 
Affirmative conduct prompting a preservation duty may involve 
the assumption of control over evidence that is reasonably foreseeable 
as (quite) important to later litigation. Such a duty might be extended 
to those who are not in a fiduciary or otherwise special relationship 
with the litigant harmed by evidence spoliation.92 Consider, for 
example, an expert retained by one future litigant to conduct evidence 
testing, who destroys or significantly alters the evidence during testing 
so that the consulting litigant’s future adversary has no opportunity to 
test independently or to observe the expert’s testing.93 The one-time 
future adversary, now involved in litigation with the party who 
retained the expert, may have an evidence spoliation claim against the 
expert.  
Consider, as well, a future litigant’s insurance adjuster who takes 
possession of, and then negligently loses or intentionally destroys, 
important potential evidence so that the litigant’s future adversary 
later has no access. The one-time future adversary, now in litigation 
 
 90. See, e.g., Reynolds, 903 F.3d at 696. 
 91. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D. 
Kan. 1992) (spoliation claim against treating physician founded on a regulatory duty 
to maintain medical records, Kan. Admin. Regs. § 100-24-1 (1998)); Longwell v. 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 970 So. 2d 1100, 1106 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 92. See generally Elliot-Thomas v. Smith, 110 N.E.3d 1231 (Ohio 2018) 
(recognizing no such duty for a lawyer to the lawyer’s client’s adversary, at least 
where evidence was concealed, but not destroyed, by the lawyer). 
 93. Once civil litigation is pending, there are some written laws on the need 
to notify, and perhaps include, an adversary when expert testing of relevant evidence 
is planned. See, e.g., TENN. R. CIV. P. 34A.01. 
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with the insured, may have an evidence spoliation claim against the 
current adversary’s insurer.94  
Finally, consider a governmental officer or agency who takes 
information and then loses it to the detriment of another involved in 
later litigation with the evidence supplier. A torts claim statute or 
comparable law might place the government in a similar position to a 
private party who spoils evidence.95  
Where a common law duty to preserve is established and is not 
dependent upon an agreement or contract, whether through a “special 
circumstance” or “affirmative conduct,” an evidence spoliation tort 
can require proof of culpability going beyond mere negligence.96 The 
 
 94. Compare Dardeen v. Kuehling, 821 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. 2004) (explaining 
why an insurer, who told insured homeowner she could remove bricks in an allegedly 
hazardous sidewalk, had no liability to pedestrian who had earlier fallen), with Jones 
v. O’Brien Tire & Battery Serv. Ctr., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (finding 
driver’s insurer potentially liable to the insured’s joint tortfeasor for failure to preserve 
wheels from driver’s car after driver’s insurer settled with a tort victim who later sued 
the insured’s joint tortfeasor; driver’s insurer had voluntarily undertaken control of 
wheels for its own benefit and should have anticipated possibility of future litigation), 
and Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ill. 1995) (holding an 
employer’s workers’ compensation insurer owed duty to preserve space heater that it 
took possession of and that was involved in a workplace accident, where employee 
pursued product liability claim against manufacturer of heater). 
 95. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 
1986) (stating that one who is arrested has a common law claim “in tort for intentional 
interference with prospective civil action [caused] by [the] spoilation of evidence[,]” 
here, the alteration of an arrest tape); see also Nichols v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
6 P.3d 300, 303–04 (Alaska 2000) (holding there is no first-party or third-party 
evidence spoliation claim founded on negligence, where first-party alleged spoliators 
were defined as the parties to the original action). But see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) 
(2012) (stating the tort claims act does not apply to claims of “malicious prosecution, 
abuse of process . . . deceit, or interference with contract rights”). A statute, court rule, 
or inherent power precedent on civil procedure sanctions often does not distinguish 
between private and public officer conduct, or between private and public entity 
conduct. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 16(f), 37 (containing no reference to any 
private/public distinction in varying sanction settings). 
 96. Boyd, 652 N.E.2d at 270–71; see, e.g., Willis v. Cost Plus, Inc., No. 16-
639, 2018 WL 1319194 (W.D. La. 2018) (while the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
held there is “no cause of action . . . for negligent spoliation[,]” lower Louisiana state 
courts have recognized a Louisiana claim for spoliation based on intentional conduct 
(quoting Reynolds v. Bordelon, 172 So. 3d 589, 592 (La. 2015)). But see Richardson 
v. Sara Lee Corp., 847 So. 2d 821 (Miss. 2003) (finding no negligence or intentional 
tort claim for spoliation of evidence). Similarly, a civil procedure law sanction for 
pre-suit evidence spoliation may only be available if intentional misconduct is shown. 
See, e.g., Tatham v. Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 734, 745–46 (Tenn. 
2015) (altering earlier laws by declaring that “intentional misconduct is not a 
prerequisite” for spoliation sanctions any longer); see also Mont. State Univ.-
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requisite degree of proof can be dependent upon whether the duty was 
owed by one who is or could have been an adverse party in the civil 
litigation wherein the lost information would have been employed.97 
Finally, even where the necessary degree of culpability is established, 
liability may vary depending upon whether the evidence was 
intentionally destroyed or only intentionally concealed.98 
B. Common Law Agreement/Contract Claims 
Agreement and contract duties operate differently than tort law 
duties for pre-suit evidence preservation. The intentions of the 
agreeing or contracting parties—rather than the hypothesized actions 
of the reasonable persons—are key. Seemingly, there can be instances 
where there are both tort and agreement or contract claims involving 
the same spoiled evidence.99  
 
Bozeman v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 426 P.3d 541, 553–54 (Mont. 2018) (explaining 
that intentional evidence spoliation prompts a rebuttable presumption that evidence 
was materially unfavorable to spoliating party, while negligent spoliation does not). 
 97. See, e.g., Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 573–74 (W. Va. 2003) 
(holding there was no negligent spoliation claim against adverse party, but a negligent 
spoliation claim against a third-party who could not otherwise be an adverse party, 
since only the former can be sanctioned under discovery laws; intentional evidence 
spoliation is a stand-alone tort available against both an adverse party and a third 
party). Compare Oliver v. Stinson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17, 20 (Mont. 1999) 
(recognizing possible negligent spoliation of evidence tort by employee against 
employer who could not otherwise be sued, due to Workers’ Compensation Act, for 
employment injuries though equipment manufacturer could be sued; request to 
preserve may have been made and, if it was, employer did not need to offer to pay 
reasonable costs of preservation), and MetLife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, 
Inc., 807 N.E.2d 865, 868 (N.Y. 2004) (discussing how a homeowner might be able 
to sue car owner’s insurer for spoliation, but seemingly would need to submit a written 
(not just oral) preservation request and to volunteer to cover the costs associated with 
preservation), with Nichols, 6 P.3d at 304 (explaining that intentional spoliation claim 
by neighbor against homeowner/tortfeasor’s insurer and against homeowner), and 
Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 427–28 (Mass. 2002) 
(discussing that no negligent evidence spoliation tort by tenant against a landlord’s 
insurer or against an expert retained by that insurer). 
 98. See, e.g., Elliott-Thomas v. Smith, 110 N.E.3d 1231, 1235 (Ohio 2018) 
(explaining the tort of intentional evidence spoliation extends to destroyed, but not 
concealed, evidence). 
 99. For example, a contractual duty of an insurer to preserve evidence 
reasonably necessary in an insured’s later defense of an action seeking damages 
beyond policy limits may arise in settings where there are also independent 
preservation duties in tort owed by the insurer to the insured or to one harmed by the 
insured. See, e.g., Silhan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (N.D. Fla. 
2002) (discussing circumstances allowing recognition of tort or contract claims by 
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The Boyd court did not elaborate on what, if any, differences 
arise between evidence preservation claims founded on agreements 
and on contracts. Perhaps the two are synonymous. Or perhaps one 
evidence preservation claim encompasses a pact made in anticipation 
of a possible lawsuit or during a lawsuit, to be guided by civil 
procedure laws. Comparable pacts include, for example, matters like 
forum selection, choice of law, and jury trial waiver. If so, the other 
evidence preservation claim encompasses a pact unrelated to litigation 
but related to the need or desire to access earlier developed materials, 
as perhaps with tax preparation, medical, or educational records. Here 
the pacts would more likely be guided by substantive contract laws, 
not civil procedure laws, though such spoliation could be the basis for 
evidence preservation disputes and sanctions in civil litigation.  
C. Statutory Claims 
Beyond common law tort and agreement or contract claims 
untethered to statutes, or other written laws like agency regulations or 
court rules, under Boyd there may be substantive law claims for 
violations of statutes on pre-suit evidence preservation. Such statutes 
can expressly recognize a claim for harm resulting from lost evidence. 
Statutory evidence preservation duties operating pre-suit can be read 
to prompt causes of action. Claims are found where statutes 
prohibiting certain conduct were intended by legislatures to enable 
those wronged to recover for their harms.100 Without such clear 
legislative intent, claims can also be implied from the statutory 
prohibitions, often where  
(1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was 
enacted; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one the statute was designed to prevent; 
(3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the 
statute; and (4) implying a private right of action is necessary to provide an 
adequate remedy for violations of the statute.101 
 
insureds against insurers due to spoliation of evidence by insurers that is needed in 
insureds’ (product liability) claims against third parties). 
 100. See, e.g., Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283–84 (2002). 
 101. Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ill. 2004). This is still good 
law in Illinois, as recognized in Alarm Detections Systems, Inc. v. Orland Fire 
Protection District, 929 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2019). See also Hardy v. Tournament 
Players Club at Southwind, Inc., 513 S.W.3d 427, 435 (Tenn. 2017). Comparable 
guidelines for implied federal claims were established in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 
(1975), whose analysis was altered as focus has now shifted primarily to legislative 
intent. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988). For differing views on 
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A medical records retention statute in Illinois is illustrative of a 
written law on which a pre-suit evidence spoliation claim might be 
based.102 There, a hospital must retain an x-ray for at least five years, 
and for up to twelve years if notified within five years that there is 
pending litigation wherein the x-ray is “possible evidence.”103 Here, 
unlike many written laws on evidence preservation, duties exist both 
pre-suit and post-suit.104 Seemingly, the Boyd precedent could support 
a substantive law claim under this statute on behalf of one harmed in 
civil litigation by a hospital’s pre-suit failure to retain covered records. 
Not unlike the Illinois statute is a California Government Code 
provision on employment record retention.105 It says:  
It shall be an unlawful practice for employers, labor organizations, and 
employment agencies subject to the provisions of this part to fail to maintain 
and preserve any and all applications, personnel, membership, or 
employment referral records and files for a minimum period of two years 
after the records and files are initially created or received, or for employers 
to fail to retain personnel files of applicants or terminated employees for a 
minimum period of two years after the date of the employment action taken 
. . . . Upon notice that a verified complaint against it has been filed under 
this part, any such employer, labor organization, or employment agency 
shall maintain and preserve any and all records and files until the complaint 
is fully and finally disposed of and all appeals or related proceedings 
terminated.106 
Another California statute is also comparable.107 It says: “Audit 
documentation shall be maintained for a minimum of seven years 
which shall be extended during the pendency of any board 
 
applying these (and other) guidelines on implied causes of action, see the varying 
opinions in Gonzaga University, 536 U.S. at 280, 291–92. 
 102. See 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1 (1975). 
 103. Id.; see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2144(F)(1) (“Hospital records shall be 
retained by hospitals . . . for a minimum period of ten years from the date a patient is 
discharged.”); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 100-24-1(a) (1998) (explaining a licensee’s duty 
to “maintain an adequate record for each patient for whom the licensee performs a 
professional service”); Longwell v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 970 So. 
2d 1100, 1106 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that deliberate spoliation is needed to 
support tort claim); Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 838 (D. Kan. 
1992) (employing KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 100-24-1 spoliation claim against doctor for 
breach of regulatory duty). 
 104. See 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 90/1. 
 105. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12946 (West 2013). 
 106. Id. This section is located within a title on state government addressing 
prohibited discrimination. 
 107. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 5097 (West 2003). 
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investigation, disciplinary action, or legal action involving the 
licensee or the licensee’s firm.”108 
Further, a federal regulation on public contract recordkeeping 
says “any personnel or employment record made or kept by the 
contractor shall be preserved by the contractor for a period of two 
years.”109 It goes on:  
Where the contractor has received notice that a complaint of discrimination 
has been filed, that a compliance evaluation has been initiated, or that an 
enforcement action has been commenced, the contractor shall preserve all 
personnel records relevant . . . until final disposition . . . . The term 
personnel records . . . would include, for example, personnel or 
employment records relating to the aggrieved person and to all other 
employees holding positions similar to that held or sought by the aggrieved 
person, and application forms or test papers completed by an unsuccessful 
applicant and by all other candidates for the same position as that for which 
the aggrieved person applied and was rejected.110  
Here, as with the Illinois medical record statute, there are both pre-suit 
and post-suit duties.  
Another federal regulation, governing producers participating in 
the Prune/Dried Plum Program of the Department of Agriculture, says 
this:  
The producers . . . must keep accurate records and accounts showing the 
details relative to the prune/plum tree removal . . . . Such records and 
accounts must be retained for two years after the date of payment to the 
producer under the program, or for two years after the date of any audit of 
records by USDA, whichever is later. Any destruction of records by the 
producer at any time will be at the risk of the producer when there is reason 
to know, believe, or suspect that matters may be or could be in dispute or 
remain in dispute.111 
There are criminal statutes on evidence preservation that may 
also be employed by civil claimants to recover for harm caused by 
evidence loss. In South Carolina, a statute addresses the duty of a 
“custodian” to “preserve all physical evidence and biological material 
related to the conviction or adjudication of a person” for certain 
offenses, including murder, criminal sexual conduct, arson, and 
certain sexual misconduct.112 While this statute operates only after a 
 
 108. Id. This section is located within a division on professions and vocations 
generally; this appears in the chapter on accountants. 
 109. Recordkeeping, 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.80(a) (2018). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Records and Accounts, 7 C.F.R. § 81.13 (2018). 
 112. S.C. CODE ANN. §17-28-320(a)(1), (10), (14), (19) (2009).  
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suit has resulted in a conviction or an adjudication,113 it could be used 
by one who is later exonerated and whose exoneration was (long) 
delayed by a statutory violation because the non-preserved evidences 
was not available for new testing methods which became available 
post-conviction.114 
IV. COMMON ELEMENTS FOR PRE-SUIT EVIDENCE PRESERVATION 
ORDERS  
Civil procedure laws operating pre-suit that promote evidence 
preservation should be expanded, via new written laws, in order to 
promote enforcement of the current substantive laws and civil 
procedure sanction laws on pre-suit evidence spoliation. As both the 
substantive and procedural laws on evidence preservation now vary 
widely between jurisdictions,115 new written laws on pre-suit evidence 
preservation orders should differ interstate and intrastate (i.e., between 
federal and state courts). Yet all such laws should contain some 
common elements. A discussion of such common elements follows.116 
A. Situs 
As to the situs of such new laws, they are best located within 
amendments to existing written civil procedure laws on perpetuating 
witness testimony via deposition.117 The goals behind pre-suit 
evidence preservation orders mirror the goals behind pre-suit 
deposition orders to perpetuate testimony, in that both involve greater 
assurance that information important for accurate fact-finding during 
later hearings or trials in civil litigation will be available in order to 
 
 113. An adjudication without a conviction of certain covered offenses, like a 
finding that a person is a “sexually violent predator,” can be made, for example, in an 
involuntary civil commitment proceeding. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-100 (2010).  
 114. Such a civil suit for harm caused by evidence loss may require proof of 
willful and malicious conduct leading to evidence loss, as this mens rea is needed for 
a criminal misdemeanor conviction. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28 -350 (2019). 
 115. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 30, at 57–59. 
 116. Our discussion is informed by Professor Spencer’s suggested reforms of 
FRCP 37. See Spencer, supra note 3, at 2022–33. It also is informed by Professor 
Hoffman’s “normative insights about safeguards” needed in expanded state pre-suit 
discovery options. Hoffman, supra note 30, at 270–80. Professor Dodson urged a 
possible FRCP 27 amendment (or a special statute) but left its elements “for another 
day.” Dodson, supra note 30, at 64. 
 117. Compare Spencer, supra note 3, at 2022–24 (suggesting placement 
within general civil procedure rules on sanctioning discovery abuses), with Dodson, 
supra note 30, at 64 (suggesting an amendment to FRCP 27).  
 Expanding Pre-Suit Discovery  675 
resolve disputed facts fairly. Unlike witness testimony perpetuation 
orders, however, other pre-suit orders concerning evidence 
preservation may also address the lack of a duty to preserve. For 
example, this could occur when those who have been asked to preserve 
evidence obtain judicial declarations that preservation is unnecessary 
or not required because the relevance of the requested evidence to the 
civil litigation is not shown or the financial burdens of preservation 
(far) outweigh the anticipated benefits to later accurate fact-finding.  
In the absence of such written amendments (or other new written 
pre-suit evidence laws), many trial courts can issue pre-suit evidence 
preservation orders founded on their inherent equitable judicial 
powers.118 Of course, inherent powers may be unavailable where 
written laws foreclose such orders.119 
B. Petitioners and Respondents 
1. Petitioners 
As to the petitioners who are eligible for pre-suit evidence 
preservation orders, Professor Spencer is correct that they should be 
limited to those who are potential parties in later related civil 
actions.120 He is wrong about the requirement that petitioners “cannot 
presently bring . . . or cause . . . to be brought” their actions or that 
petitioners should be limited to forums within the judicial system 
wherein the expected claims may later be filed.121 Further, he is wrong 
that a petitioner must always proceed only where “any expected 
adverse party resides or may be found.”122 To facilitate convenience 
for a respondent, a pre-suit evidence preservation proceeding should 
 
 118. See, e.g., Stokes v. 835 N. Washington St., LLC, 784 A.2d 1142, 1149 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (allowing pre-suit land inspection); see also Wofford v. 
Ethyl Corp., 447 S.E.2d 187, 189 (S.C. 1994) (allowing inspection of employer’s 
plant, documents, and other tangible evidence relating to employee’s injury and later 
death).  
 119. Stokes, 784 A.2d at 1149 (explaining that no Maryland rules prohibit an 
equitable bill of discovery directed at the inspection of land of a nonparty; such rules 
“may well violate” the requesting party’s “right[s] of access to the courts”). 
 120. See Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023 (proposed FRCP 37(e)(A)(3)(i)). But 
see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa, 195 A.3d 538, 540 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 2017) (discussing how the insurer of prospective defendant can 
seek pre-suit discovery under N.J. Ct. R. 4:11-1). 
 121. Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023. 
 122. Id.  
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be available, at times, where the respondent, not then an expected 
adverse party, resides or is involved in significant related acts.123  
Allowing pre-suit evidence preservation petitions even when 
civil actions could be filed would serve several important purposes, 
including allowing petitioners to be better assured that their pre-suit 
“reasonable pre-filing inquiry” duties on claim preservations have 
been met,124 avoiding defenses to petitioners raising issues of current 
ability to sue, and promoting more informed pre-suit settlements.  
Allowing pre-suit petitions in judicial systems wherein later 
related civil claims may not be filed preserves for petitioners their 
right to choose forums. Further, they facilitate information gathering 
and often convenience to respondents by allowing, for example, 
requests in state courts in closer proximity to the evidence sought than 
any federal courts, though later federal suits are contemplated, if not 
required, by exclusive subject matter jurisdiction laws.125 The 
recognition of a broader array of potential witnesses and potential 
venues for pre-suit preservation orders parallels the extensive forums 
sometimes available for orders on pre-suit witness testimony 
perpetuation via deposition.126  
2. Respondents 
As to respondents, a broad range of people and entities should 
be able to be ordered pre-suit to produce or to preserve evidence. 
Professor Spencer is correct that information may be ordered from 
persons, rather than just from an “expected adverse party” who, of 
course, must be notified of pre-suit discovery requests involving 
 
 123. See id. Surely there are personal jurisdiction-like limits on securing 
authority over both a respondent and an expected adverse party. These limits are less 
significant in the Article III federal courts since national, rather than state, powers are 
exercised. Article III court powers are sometimes available nationwide over U.S. 
citizens, as in statutory interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (where claimants “may 
be found”). Article III court powers sometimes are available in more limited settings, 
though still beyond state court powers, as with extraterritorial personal jurisdiction 
over FRCP 14 third party defendants under FRCP 4(k)(1)(B) (“100 miles from where 
the summons was issued”).  
 124. Id. at 2020.  
 125. See id. at 2013. 
 126. For example, the federal rule on witness testimony perpetuation, 
followed in several U.S. states, allows a petition to be filed in any community (i.e., 
under the FRCP in any district and under the Arkansas rule in any county) “where any 
expected adverse party resides.” FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1); see also ARK. R. CIV. P. 
27(a)(1).  
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anyone.127 There is no reason to think that pre-suit discovery is 
generally more burdensome on respondents than post-suit discovery 
wherein parties and nonparties alike can be summoned via 
depositions. Of course, pre-suit discovery is necessarily somewhat 
more speculative as there is no guarantee of a later related civil action. 
So, respondents should be less available for pre-suit discovery than for 
post-suit discovery. Greater limits should be set out in the new civil 
procedure laws on the petition content requirements for those seeking 
pre-suit evidence preservation orders.  
We agree with the Texas Supreme Court that a Texas trial court 
should not be able to authorize pre-suit discovery from “persons” 
seeking to identify an “expected adverse party” where the court is 
without personal jurisdiction over the anticipated party.128 The Texas 
Court concluded that a state trial court should not be turned into “the 
world’s inspector general.”129 We acknowledge that some focus should 
be on the authority over the “persons” from whom discovery is sought. 
We also understand that post-suit depositions can occur in Texas 
involving lawsuits already pending elsewhere. But there, some court 
has found authority over a party who may be affected by the discovery. 
While pre-suit Texas discovery devices should not be available to 
assist some seeking information on reasonably anticipated claims 
without such authority being first established, those seeking 
information can utilize fact-gathering devices outside the discovery 
rules.  
C. Petition Contents 
Petitions seeking pre-suit evidence preservation orders, given 
their pleas for extraordinary relief involving discovery disclosures, 
should be quite detailed, as well as certified and verified by lawyers 
and their clients. Lawyers should certify reasonable inquiry, which 
might include meet and confer and proportionality requirements. Their 
clients should verify the factual circumstances prompting their need 
 
 127. See Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023 (proposed FRCP 37(e)(3)(A)); see 
also Hoffman, supra note 30, at 270–72 (describing the need in Texas for an express 
requirement of such notice). 
 128. In re Doe, 444 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Tex. 2014) (“If a Rule 202 court need 
not have personal jurisdiction over a potential defendant, the rule could be used by 
anyone in the world to investigate anyone else in the world against whom suit could 
be brought . . . . The reach of the court’s power to compel testimony would be limited 
only by its grasp over witnesses.”).  
 129. Id. at 611.  
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for judicial assistance. Such requirements would be similar to the 
usual dictates on those—including lawyers and their clients—who file 
complaints or who seek provisional remedies.130 
In his FRCP 37(e) proposal, Professor Spencer urged that a 
petition should only be pursued by one expecting to be a party in a 
civil action “cognizable in a United States court” who “cannot 
presently bring it or cause it to be brought.”131 We think that petitioners 
should sometimes be able to proceed even where any future claim may 
not, or even likely will not, be brought. Pre-suit settlements founded 
on accurate factual assessments should be encouraged. Federal and 
state civil procedure laws on evidence preservation via a pre-suit 
deposition to perpetuate testimony have no requirements on the 
current inability to bring a civil action or cause a civil action to be 
brought.132  
Professor Spencer was right in arguing that a petition should 
contain “the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner’s 
interest;” the facts a petitioner wishes to establish through use of the 
preserved material; and the expected adverse party or parties in the 
expected action, “so far as known.”133 
Professor Lonny S. Hoffman rightly argued pre-suit discovery 
should only be permitted where the “information . . . cannot otherwise 
be obtained.”134 Judicial oversight, as well as reasonable inquiry and 
proportionality limits, will prompt pre-suit discoverers to engage in 
more efficient information gathering techniques.135 Our concern with 
Professor Hoffman’s limit is that there may be availability of the 
information, but the nondiscovery avenue is quite costly, burdensome, 
and time consuming compared to the pre-suit discovery avenue. We 
recognize that others favor a more limited scope for pre-suit discovery, 
 
 130. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (asserting that lawyers must certify that 
“legal contentions are warranted by existing law” or by a non-frivolous argument for 
a change in the law); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (stating that parties responsible for Rule 
11 violations, typically involving factual contentions without evidentiary support, per 
FRCP 11(b)(3), may be sanctioned); FED. R. CIV. P. 65 (explaining that requests for 
temporary restraining orders must be supported by “specific facts in an affidavit or a 
verified complaint clearly” showing the need for immediate relief).  
 131. Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023 (providing proposed FRCP 
37(e)(3)(A)(i)).  
 132. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-20-
27(a)(1) (2017). 
 133. Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023–24 (proposing FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(e)(3)(A)(ii)-(iv)). 
 134. Hoffman, supra note 30, at 274–75. 
 135. See id. at 272–74. 
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as with testimony or evidence that could be lost or destroyed before 
suit is filed.136 
As to verification, the person or entity petitioning for a 
preservation order should verify certain facts expressly on the 
condition that a sanction may follow if verification is found to have 
been undertaken without reasonable inquiry, without a good factual 
basis, or with an improper purpose. Professor Spencer also urges there 
be “a verified petition.”137 The Illinois court rule on an independent 
action before suit to identify those who may be “responsible in 
damages” requires a verified petition containing the necessity of the 
discovery and the nature of the discovery sought.138  
Some individual or entity liability for sanctions upon verification 
failures by agents should also be expressly recognized in a new written 
pre-suit evidence preservation law so that lawyers and judges are 
informed of the consequences of failures of verification.139  
As to certification, the lawyer pursuing a client’s pre-suit 
evidence preservation request should certify certain circumstances on 
the condition that a sanction may follow if certification is found 
deficient. Pre-suit discovery should not be undertaken by a lawyer on 
a client’s behalf without reasonable inquiry,140 without a good legal 
basis, or with an improper purpose by a lawyer’s client or by a lawyer 
(including promoting such a purpose on behalf of a client).141 Again, 
 
 136. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. v. Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa, 195 A.3d 538, 
541 (N.J. 2017) (discussing N.J. CT. R. 4:11-1, which covers testimony perpetuation, 
evidence preservation, and document or property inspection). 
 137. Spencer, supra note 3, at 2023 (proposing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(3)(A)).  
 138. Compare ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(a)(1)(i)-(ii), with 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 
5/2-402 (2006) (stating there is no verification when discovery sought from 
respondents in discovery in a pending civil action).  
 139. Liability for all agent actions is not needed. Compare this idea to FRCP 
11 on law firm liability for only some pleading failures by their attorneys. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11. For example, entity liability should arise when an agent’s failure was 
caused, wholly or in significant part, by the entity’s deficient system on litigation 
holds. But no entity liability should be grounded on an agent’s purposeful evidence 
destruction solely geared to shielding the agent from liability to the entity or a third 
party.  
 140. Professor Hoffman urges that for pre-suit discovery, there need be “a 
reasonable probability . . . that the discovery sought will result in a viable claim” (or, 
for us, a defense) and “a good-faith basis for believing” important facts will be 
unearthed. Hoffman, supra note 30, at 275–76. 
 141. A client’s improper purpose, for example, may be apparent to the lawyer 
during the client’s initial solicitation of the lawyer’s help, where the attorney-client 
communication privilege would not operate, as with the crime-fraud exception.  
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there should be available individual or entity liability for sanctions 
arising from failures of attorney certifications.  
D. Proportionality  
As with many post-suit discovery requests or orders, a pre-suit 
evidence preservation request or order should only be made after a 
determination on appropriate proportionality by both the petitioner 
and the trial judge.142 For post-suit discovery in a federal district court, 
one presenting a discovery request must certify that the request is 
“neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, 
considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the 
amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the 
action.”143 In ruling upon such a presentation a district judge must 
consider whether the request is  
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the 
issues at stake[,] . . . the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access 
to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the 
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the 
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit[s].144 
Clearly, these proportionality assessments will differ for the 
same requested information in pre-suit and post-suit settings. Given 
the more speculative nature of the need for the information, 
proportionality relating to pre-suit requests will be inherently more 
difficult to demonstrate. We do not, however, think that an irreparable 
harm standard is necessary before pre-suit discovery is permitted. Pre-
suit factual inquiry duties for prospective civil litigants and others 
must always be undertaken reasonably; they need not be limited to 
exceptional circumstances. The aforenoted pre-suit witness testimony 
perpetuation norms, as well as party and claim identification discovery 
norms, carry no irreparable harm or exceptional circumstance 
standard.  
Access to justice should not be inhibited by pre-suit roadblocks 
to accessing information unsupported by legitimate public policies, 
especially when they are erected by those seeking to avoid the legal 
responsibilities prompted by their own actions. While in civil 
litigation there is generally no privilege against self-incrimination, that 
 
 142. Explicit requirements on proportionality assessments for post-suit 
discovery requests sometimes are only recognized for the trial judges. See, e.g., ILL. 
SUP. CT. R. 201(c)(3).  
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii). 
 144. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
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privilege may be employed where there remains potential criminal 
litigation. Thus, judicial assessments of pre-suit discovery requests 
will differ for requests directed at potential defendants and for requests 
directed at nonparty witnesses. 
E. Meet and Confer 
Pre-suit evidence preservation petitions, outside of witness 
testimony perpetuation via deposition, should normally be required to 
be preceded by “meet and confer” encounters between potential 
petitioners and respondents wherein any concerns are aired and 
perhaps resolved. Therein, reasonable efforts should be made to agree 
on information access.145 Such compelled encounters are 
commonplace in federal and state civil procedure laws when post-suit 
disputes arise regarding discovery.146 They also track the many 
procedural laws on the need to meet and confer before post-suit 
discovery begins so that a discovery plan can be formulated.147  
Following post-suit discovery laws, pre-suit evidence 
preservation petitions should also be noticed to, and afford conferral 
opportunities for, later potential parties who are not respondents.148 
 
 145. This requirement attends the Ohio rule on identifying potential 
defendants before suit. See OHIO R. Civ. P. 34(D)(3)(c). 
 146. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (explaining that parties must make a 
good faith effort to resolve discovery disputes before a motion for a protective order 
may be filed). Similar state civil procedure laws include ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(k), ARK. 
R. CIV. P. 26(c), and W. VA. R. CIV. P. 26(c). Local court rules sometimes extend such 
dispute resolution obligations following private meet and confers which do not resolve 
discovery disputes. See, e.g., S.D. IND. R. 37-1(a) (explaining that before district judge 
involvement in a “formal discovery motion,” counsel must confer with “assigned 
Magistrate Judge” in order to see if dispute resolution is possible).  
 147. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (requiring good faith effort to formulate 
discovery plan); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (explaining that there can be no 
discovery until conferral required by FRCP 26(f) on discovery plan). Similar state 
civil procedure laws include MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06(b), IOWA R. Civ. P 1.507, and 
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 26(f). See also N.D. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (explaining that a discovery 
planning meeting is required upon request by one party); N.C. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (stating 
similar).  
 148. Professor Hoffman found in Texas that a lack of an express notice 
requirement covering future litigants led to instances of no notice given, prompting 
changes to the Texas pre-suit discovery rule. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 270–72. 
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F. Available Forms of Relief  
Pre-suit evidence preservation orders should, at times, prompt 
information disclosures to petitioners together with information 
preservations by respondents.149 So, sometimes copies of documents 
will be ordered to be revealed to petitioners while the originals will be 
ordered to be preserved by the respondents.  
Pre-suit evidence preservation orders may also, at times, prompt 
disclosures necessitating evidence destruction. For example, a 
machine involved in an accident might be ordered tested even if the 
testing will result in complete destruction, or permanent alteration, of 
the machine. Of course, all reasonably foreseeable parties to future 
litigation involving the machine should have opportunities to test or to 
observe testing. 
Pre-suit preservation orders might prompt evidence preservation 
by a respondent though there is then no disclosure to a petitioner and 
no evidence destruction. For example, a preservation, but no 
disclosure, order could allow for a later determination of a privilege 
claim when the relevance or need for the preserved nondisclosed 
evidence can be more reasonably assessed.  
Finally, available forms of relief should include protective 
orders. Thus, at least some who receive pre-suit evidence preservation 
demand letters should have standing to seek declaratory relief on 
whether or not there is a preservation duty and, if so, what the 
parameters are of such a duty. Standing is easily justified in settings 
where the evidence in question is key to reasonably anticipated 
litigation; where the facts are chiefly, if not wholly, undisputed; and 
where the legal issue of duty is said to arise from an explicit statute or 
from an express contract whose validity cannot be reasonably 
disputed. 
G. Cost Shifting and Sanctions 
The costs of compliance with pre-suit evidence preservation 
orders directing that certain evidence be disclosed to the petitioner, or 
preserved by the respondent, should be similarly shifted from the 
respondent to the petitioner as are compliance costs for comparable 
post-suit discovery orders.150 This approach provides little incentive to 
 
 149. Hoffman’s article provides more on the general need for judicial 
oversight of pre-suit discovery. See id. at 272–74. 
 150. Compare 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/1-101 (2019) (stating that respondent 
in discovery is “paid expenses and fees provided for witnesses”), with ILL. SUP. CT. R. 
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accelerate discovery before suit. Moreover, cost shifting arising from 
sanctions founded on pre-suit discovery law failures should be 
available.  
Sanctions for pre-suit discovery violations should be available 
and track the sanctions available for similar (or somewhat similar) 
post-suit discovery violations.151 Of course, there will be no perfect 
overlap. For example, sanctions involving future jury instructions 
would generally be out of place in pre-suit discovery settings.152  
Vexing choice-of-law issues might arise where pre-suit 
discovery violations involving pre-suit evidence preservation orders 
surface in later, related civil actions. Federal district courts already 
struggle with whose spoliation sanction laws govern when diversity or 
supplemental claims are involved, with most courts ultimately 
applying federal civil procedure laws.153 Where there are findings in 
later, related federal civil actions that earlier state court evidence 
preservation orders were violated, even thornier questions arise. While 
possible, it seems inefficient for the federal courts to refer those 
violations back to the state courts whose orders were violated. When 
the violations are addressed in the federal courts, should it matter for 
choice of discovery sanction law purposes that the violations occurred 
before the federal actions were commenced? And should state 
discovery sanction laws for violations of pre-suit state court 
preservation orders ever be applied in federal courts even where the 
pending claims in federal court only involve federal substantive laws? 
 
224(c) (stating that “reasonable expenses of complying” with pre-suit discovery 
requests designed to identify those responsible for damages “shall be borne” by the 
independent action petitioner seeking discovery).  
 151. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 224(b) (explaining that sanctions available for 
post-suit discovery violations “may be utilized by a party initiating” an independent 
action for pre-suit discovery or by a respondent in such an action).  
 152. However, in pre-suit settings future jury instructions should be addressed 
where the relevant law on evidence preservation expressly addresses future jury 
instructions when the law is violated. See, e.g., Recordkeeping, 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.80 
(2014) (covering a contractor’s duty to preserve certain personnel and employment 
records; presumption that records were unfavorable to the party failing to preserve 
arises, but not where a failure resulted from circumstances outside the control of the 
party).  
 153. See, e.g., Sherman v. Rinchem Co., 687 F.3d 996, 1006 (8th Cir. 2012); 
see also Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(applying federal evidentiary rules rather than state spoliation laws in diversity suits). 
But see Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Grp. Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 267 (2d Cir. 1999); Keller v. 
United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the split in federal 
courts).  
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Sanction requests for pre-suit evidence preservation failures surely 
will sometimes present challenges in later civil litigation. 
H. Appeals  
As there are no claims in the traditional sense, in pre-suit 
evidence preservation proceedings any appeals cannot be grounded on 
a final judgment rule or on related doctrines. Appellate standards 
should be comparable to the standards for interlocutory reviews of 
formal discovery orders.154 Discretionary assessments by either or both 
trial and intermediate appellate court judges seem warranted. Trial 
judges should assess, at times, the impact on the parties of their orders 
about any evidence disclosure as well as the significance of the legal 
issues, especially questions of privileged communications, work 
product, and other public-policy based immunities from compelled 
involuntary disclosure. Similarly, discretionary assessments by 
appellate justices should be the norm. Sometimes, appeals of pre-suit 
discovery orders would constitute “friendly contempt” proceedings.  
I. Later Effects  
As noted, because pre-suit discovery is more speculative 
regarding actual disputes than post-suit discovery, denials of pre-suit 
evidence preservation petitions should not foreclose similar discovery 
requests post-suit. Further, grants of pre-suit evidence preservation 
petitions should not foreclose similar discovery requests post-suit 
since new information may have been created or old information may 
have become unreliable. The general duty to supplement earlier post-
suit discovery responses should not attend pre-suit discovery 
responses, though certain exceptions do seem worthwhile.155  
 
 154. These standards vary in American appellate courts, as with mandamus 
petitions, as in In re Hewlett Packard, 212 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tex. App. 2006), and 
with interlocutory appeals of injunctions, as in Zitella v. Mike’s Transportation, LLC, 
99 N.E.3d 535, 539–40 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (differentiating between non-appealable 
discovery orders). 
 155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1)(A) (learning earlier disclosure or response is 
“incomplete or incorrect”). Notwithstanding the absence of a general duty to 
supplement, pre-suit discovery respondents should have the means to correct or 
supplement their earlier responses. As well, pre-suit evidence preservation orders 
should be able to include special duties to supplement as where respondents agree that 
significant new information will be provided. Consider, for example, a general duty 
to supplement a pre-suit discovery response when the respondent should have known 
an earlier response was founded on lies that were only recently uncovered.  
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CONCLUSION 
New civil procedure laws should, at the least, authorize pre-suit 
court orders involving evidence preservation when the evidence, 
relevant to possible civil litigation, will likely spoil otherwise and is 
subject to a preservation duty under substantive law.156 These new 
laws should originate in amendments to the written civil procedure 
laws on witness testimony perpetuation via deposition.157 New laws 
should authorize both pre-suit discovery and pre-suit orders declaring 
a lack of any preservation duty where a pre-suit evidence preservation 
demand has been made, is disputed, and warrants immediate judicial 
attention. The availability of more expansive pre-suit evidence 
preservation orders will promote greater uniformity among the trial 
courts within a particular judicial system, prompt more informed 




 156. See, e.g., id. 
 157. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.106(6)(a) (2013) (noting that pre-suit civil 
discovery laws originate in varying sources, including court rules, statutes, and case 
precedents). 
